Trajectory datasets are becoming more and more popular due to the massive usage of GPS and other location-based devices and services. In this paper, we address privacy issues regarding the identification of individuals in static trajectory datasets. We provide privacy protection by defining trajectory k-anonymity, meaning every released information refers to at least k users/trajectories. We propose a novel generalization-based approach that applies to trajectories and sequences in general. We also suggest the use of a simple random reconstruction of the original dataset from the anonymization, to overcome possible drawbacks of generalization approaches.
INTRODUCTION
Data publishing is essential for providing resources for research, and for the transparency of government institutions and companies. However, data publishing is also risky since published data may contain sensitive information. Therefore, the first step before data publishing is to remove the personally identifying information. In [39] , it has been shown that removing personally identifying information is not enough to protect privacy. This is due to the fact that the released database can be linked to public databases through a set of common attributes which are called quasi-identifiers. For example in US the combination of zip code, and birth date is unique for 87% of the citizens [39] . This figure increases as more attributes are added to the combination. Sweeney et al. showed that they could re-identify the supposedly anonymous health records via linking them to publicly available voters registration list. This striking result increased the concerns and research efforts for privacy and anonymization in published databases. The problem of linkage becomes even more complicated in our highly connected world as the number and variety of data sources increase.
Mobile service providers can now predict the location of mobile users via triangulation with a high precision. Coupled with applications such as location-based services (LBS) that are enabled by GPS equipped mobile devices, it is now very easy to track the location of individuals voluntarily or non-voluntarily over a period of time. The time and location information of a person (or a moving object in general) collected over a period of time forms a trajectory which can be thought of as a set of spatio-temporal data points spanning a time interval. Trajectory data sets contain valuable information which can be harvested by data mining tools to obtain models for applications such as city traffic planning or marketing.
However, time and location are sensitive information, therefore personally identifying information needs to be removed from trajectories before they can be released. But, even after de-identification, trajectory data sets are still prone to linkage attacks since space and time attributes are very powerful quasi-identifiers. For example, for a trajectory that starts at a specific location every weekday in the morning and reaches another location in an hour, it is very easy to infer that the starting location in the morning is home, and the location reached after an hour is the work place. What an adversary can do is to look at a phone directory to search for home addresses and work addresses to link the trajectories with their owners.
In general, the solution to prevent linkage attacks in de-identified data sets is anonymization [39, 38] . k-Anonymity was proposed as a standard for privacy over relational databases. It can be summarized as "safety in numbers" and ensures that every entity in the table is indistinguishable from k − 1 other entities. Achieving optimal k-anonymity was proven to be NP-Hard, therefore heuristic algorithms have been proposed in the literature to k-anonymize data sets. In case of spatio-temporal trajectories the problem of anonymization is even harder since consecutive points in a trajectory are dependent on each other. Therefore anonymization should consider every trajectory as a whole when anonymizing.
In this paper, we concentrate on spatio-temporal trajectories. We first extend the notion of k-anonymity for trajectories and then describe a heuristic method for achieving k-anonymity of trajectories. Trajectories are then published by only releasing a representative trajectory to further protect the privacy of people whose trajectories refer to.
Outline of the paper. In Section 2 we give some motivating applications for anonymization of static trajectory and sequence datasets. In Section 3 related work on privacy over relational databases and spatio-temporal data is presented. We then describe the problem of trajectory anonymity in Section 4. Detailed algorithms on how to obtain generalized trajectories and results on the computational complexity are given in Section 5, while in Section 6 we propose a (optional in general but required in some applications) reconstruction step to release only a representative trajectory (instead of generalized trajectories). In Section 7 we present results of our empirical experimentation. Finally, in Section 8 we discuss future work and possible extensions to our approach, following with conclusions.
APPLICATIONS
The following motivates the anonymization of static trajectory databases:
• As the use of mobile devices grows rapidly, the value of storing spatio-temporal data is better understood. Business companies, governments, and science institutes are heavily collecting and storing spatio-temporal data to extract useful and relevant information [37, 30, 42, 31, 28, 11] .
• The applications over mobile data, such as GPS data, is no longer limited to location based servicing or querying. Several spatio-temporal data mining techniques has been developed. Such techniques has been used by business companies to maximize employee efficiency [30] , by governments to understand the infrastructure [42] and by research groups to observe human behavior [31, 28, 37] .
• As in the case of conventional databases, storing of spatio-temporal data along with the variety and importance of applications necessitate the release of the data. Since most trajectory databases contain personal information, publicizing is subject to privacy regulations and requires deidentification [14, 15, 21] . One of the most effective and recognized technique for de-identification is anonymization [21] .
• Even though human data is subject to changes, most real world applications work on static data. The reason is the high cost of mining dynamic information in terms of both accuracy and efficiency. Most systems instead follow a trade off. Changes in the system are captured by incremental mining up to date data periodically (e.g. monitor the traffic continuously but mine the data every week) or updating the existing data mining model with fresh data. In either cases, static databases are valuable, and have been the subject of many works on privacy preserving data publishing [38, 29, 4, 27, 33] .
RELATED WORK

k-Anonymity and Privacy over Relational Databases
Addressing privacy concerns when releasing person specific datasets is well studied in the literature [38, 29, 4, 27, 33] . Simply removing uniquely identifying information (SSN, name) from data is not sufficient to prevent identification because partially identifying information (quasiidentifiers (QI); age, sex, city . . . ) can still be mapped to individuals by using external knowledge [39] . k-Anonymity is defined in [38] , to protect against identification of individuals in person specific datasets.
Definition 1 (k-Anonymity:). A table T
* is k-anonymous w.r.t. a set of attributes QI if each record in T * [QI] appears at least k times.
k-Anonymity property ensures that a given set of quasi identifiers can only be mapped to at least k entities in the dataset. The most common technique being used to anonymize a given dataset is value generalizations and suppressions. In multidimensional space, the counter part of these operations is replacing a set of points with the minimum bounding box that covers the points. It should be noted that k-anonymization via generalizations and suppressions preserves the truth of the data; explaining the data at a higher granularity.
Entities in trajectory datasets are more complex than those studied by classical k-anonymity approaches. Anonymization of complex entities was proposed in [36] where data about private entities reside in multiple datasets of a relational database. Even though trajectory datasets can be represented in relational databases, order of points over a given trajectory matters due to the linear time property. Work in [36] does not assume any ordering between points. Also applications over trajectory databases are very specific and require different cost metrics and different anonymization techniques.
In [29] authors also warn that, in each set of people with same values for the anonymized QI ℓ-diversity must hold, i.e., sensitive attribute values must be diverse enough. Otherwise, it is possible to infer the exact sensitive value with arbitrarily high probability. We will discuss how to extend the concept of ℓ-diversity for trajectory dataset in Section 8.
As done in previous work on LBS and trajectory privacy, we will not directly address ℓ-diversity issues during the presentation, while we will sketch some possible approaches to this interesting issue as a future work in Section 9.
Privacy-preserving LBS
There has been a lot of work on privacy issues regarding the use of location based services (LBSs) by mobile users. Most work defined the privacy risk as linking of requests and locations to specific mobile users. Works in [13, 22] used perturbation and obfuscation techniques to deidentify a given request or a location; they differ from this work in the privacy constraints they enforce. Anonymization based privacy protection was used in [16, 5, 18, 19, 32, 10] . In [19] , anonymity was enforced on sensitive locations other than user location points or trajectories. In [16, 18, 32, 10, 3] , individual location points belonging to a user is assumed to be unlinked and points of the users are anonymized other than the trajectories. In [5] , anonymization process enforces points referring to same set of users to be anonymized together always. However work assumes anonymization per request other than whole trajectory anonymization and heuristic to specify groups of users is restricted in a time frame.
(Such an approach does not anonymize time.) In [17] , location privacy is protected via cryptographic techniques based on the theoretical work on private information retrieval.
Trace and Trajectory Anonymization
All of the proposed privacy preservation methods on LBSs so far assume a dynamic, real-time environment and methodology being used is based on local decisions. We are also aware of very recent, independent work [6, 23, 40] addressing the problem of preserving privacy in static trajectory databases. Both works rely on uncertainty in the spatiotemporal data in order to enforce anonymity. The first technique [6] protects privacy by shifting trajectory points (that are already close to each other in time) in space. Clusters of k trajectories are enforced to be close to each other to fall in the same area of uncertainty given by a user parameter representing the GPS precision. The second work [23] presents a subsampling-based algorithm, i.e., privacy is preserved by removing some points s.t. uncertainty between consecutive points is increased to avoid identification. Due to the inherit uncertainty assumption of both works on trajectories, the privacy constraints enforced and the cost metric do not match with those used in this work. Work in [40] is suppression based, limits the probability of disclosing the tail of the trajectories given the head of the trajectories. However technique is suppression based and protection is one way.
In this work, we address the privacy concerns when publishing static trajectory databases by extending the concept of k-anonymity to trajectories. We model trajectories in a general way (sequences of spatio-temporal points) such that the same techniques can be possibly used in other context (sequence events, strings, non-euclidean spaces, etc.) without much effort.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that extends the concept of relational k-anonymity to trajectories without relying on data distortion and uncertainty. We instead remove information from the data by making use of space and time generalizations, point alignment both in space and time, point and trajectory suppressions. The basic methodology does not rely on uncertainty (as was the case in previous works). The cost metric being used is statistically derived and captures time and space sensitivity to address various applications. Also no previous work seems to have measured the level of distortion due to anonymization in the context of trajectory mining applications, which we consider one of the ultimate purpose in trajectory publishing.
In systems where freshness of the data is crucial (e.g., healthcare data, stream data), release (and anonymization) of data needs to be on the fly. An important example is authenticated LBS, where authenticated users send streams of queries to a service provider, and a trusted anonymizer filters the communication by applying anonymization techniques. To the best of our knowledge, no work on authenticated LBS studied space-time generalization, although it is considered a state-of-the-art technique for non-authenticated LBS. Our work makes the assumption that all the data is static. Adapting trajectory k-anonymization framework given in this paper for such online systems is no different than adapting conventional k-anonymization for dynamic databases. The latter is already studied by the literature [41, 8] and such an extension to the framework is not theoretically challenging. However supporting dynamic trajectory databases may introduce additional loss in utility. We leave the practical evaluation of the extension as future work.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
Notation
We assume the space is discretized into ǫs × ǫs size grids and a point in our domain is actually a grid. All space measurements are in units of ǫs. We assume time is also discretized into buckets of size ǫt and domain of time is finite. So datasets act as the snapshots of the world in many time instances. Datasets with continuous time and space domains can be fit into this assumption by the use of interpolations. The level of granularity in discretization does not affect the efficiency of the proposed methodology.
We define a trajectory database in an object-oriented way. A trajectory dataset T is a set of private entities or trajectories (e.g., T = {tr1, · · · , trn}, |T | = n). Each private entity tri is an ordered set of spatio-temporal 3D volumes (e.g., points) composed of time, x, and y dimensions (e.g., tri = {p1, · · · , pm} where p k =< t k , x k , y k >, |tri| = m). We assume that the ti, xi and yi components are range of values defined as ti : [t . tris refer to the individuals and each triplet specifies the area location of the individual at some time in the corresponding time interval. We use the following notation for components to express their length; |xi| = |x
We also use '·' operator to refer to a specific component of a bigger set. (E.g., tri.pj: jth point of the ith trajectory)
We say a trajectory tr1 is a subset of another trajectory tr2 and write tr1 ⊂ tr2 if for each point pi ∈ tr2, we have some unique pj ∈ tr1 such that t
We say a trajectory tr is atomic if |xi| = |yi| = |ti| = 1 for every pi ∈ tr. We use the notation BBP for the 3D point with minimum volume that covers all points inside set P (E.g., minimum bounding box).
We also assume S is the universal space (the maximum area possible in the space domain), T is the universal time (the maximum time interval in the time domain), and U is the universal volume (U = S · T ).
Problem Definition
We assume that prior to release, the trajectory database is complete and static. No uniquely identifying information is released. However we assume that we have adversaries that may 1. already know some portion of the trajectory of an indi-vidual in the dataset and may be interested in the rest. (e.g., adversary knows that a particular person lives in a particular house. He also knows that she leaves the house and comes back home at specified times. He is interested in finding the locations she visited.) 2. already know the whole trajectory of an individual but be interested in some sensitive information about the individual. This is a concern if some sensitive info is also released, as part of the database, for some of the spatio-temporal triplets or for some individuals. Sensitive info, for example, could be the requests done by the individual to location based services.
We protect privacy of the individuals against the above adversary by using the following techniques
• k-Anonymity: anonymize the dataset so that every trajectory is indistinguishable from k − 1 other trajectories.
• Reconstruction: release atomic trajectories sampled randomly from the area covered by anonymized trajectories.
k-Anonymity limits the adversary's ability to link any information to an individual. Reconstruction further prevents leakage due to anonymization. Both techniques are discussed in Sections 5 and 6.
Since reconstruction is just sampling from anonymized data, expectation on the amount of privacy-utility depends only on the anonymization. As an anonymization is required to satisfy the privacy constraints, it also needs to maximize the utilization. An anonymization with a reconstruction that better explains the data is considered to be highly utilized. However the amount of utilization also depends on the target applications. Although there may be many classes of target applications, in this work, we consider two of them:
Time Sensitive Applications: This class covers the applications in which the time component is crucial compared to space components. Trajectories that have similar paths in space, but occur in different time periods are considered to be far away from each other. Such applications include mining traffic data to monitor traffic jams, anomaly detection when timely access control constraints are in place, etc.
Space Sensitive Applications: Similarities are calculated w.r.t. space. Time shifted trajectories or trajectories with different velocities can be considered to be close. Target applications include mining the world for region popularity to make business decisions, measuring road erosion caused by vehicles for maintenance, etc. Section 6.2 discusses that some anonymization tr * of tr minimizing the following equation (log cost metric 1 ) also maximizes the probability of generating the exact dataset.
[ws(log |xi| + log |yi|) + wt log |ti|] +(|tr| − |tr * |) · (ws log S + wt log T ) (1) where ws and wt are weights to adjust sensitivity to space and time respectively.
From now on, our objective is to minimize Equation 1 while respecting k-anonymity in anonymizations. In later sections to ease the discussion, we assume, without loss of generality, ws = wt = 1 unless noted otherwise.
K-ANONYMITY IN TRAJECTORY DATABASES
In this section, we redefine the k-anonymity notion for sets of trajectories. Next, we use a condensation based approach to form groups of similar trajectories. Last, we show how to k-anonymize trajectories in a given group. Anonymization process will be dependent on the selection of metric parameters being used for grouping.
k-Anonymity for Trajectory Databases
Original k-anonymity prevents an adversary from identifying a given QI to be in a set with less than k elements in the anonymized dataset. Since we assume adversaries know about all or some of the spatio-temporal points about an individual, the set of all points corresponding to a trajectory become the quasi identifiers in our domain. k-anonymity requires that a given trajectory in the original dataset can at best be linked to at least k trajectories in the anonymized dataset. It can be shown easily that the following definition for k-anonymity satisfies the requirement and also preserves the truth of the original dataset:
Definition 2 (Trajectory k-Anonymity). A trajectory database T * is a k-anonymization of a trajectory dataset T if
• for every trajectory in T * , there are at least k − 1 other trajectories with exactly the same set of points.
• trajectories in T and T * can be sorted such a way that the ith trajectories tr * i ∈ T * , tri ⊂ tr * satisfies tri ⊂ tr * i for all i.
Following definitions show how to create anonymization of a set of trajectories.
Definition 3 (Point Link and Matching). A point link between a set of trajectories T R = {tr1, · · · , trn} is an ordered set of points P L = {p1, · · · , pn} such that pi ∈ tri. An ordered set of point links between trajectories in T R, P M = {P L1, · · · , P Lm}, is a point matching between the trajectories if for all i < j and all possible k, P Li.t Theorem 1. Let T R = {tr1, · · · , trn} be a set of trajectories and P M = {P L1, · · · , P Lm} be a valid point matching between them. Let T R * = {tr * 1 , · · · , tr * n } be another set such that tr *
Proof. Since all the n elements in T R * are the same, the first requirement of anonymity trivially holds. Since each point in tr * j is a bounding box for some point in trj; trj ⊂ tr * j . The second requirement also holds. Theorem 1 states that any matching between the points of a given set of trajectories can be used to anonymize the trajectories. Although there are many possible matchings, the aim of the anonymization is to find the one that will minimize the log cost of the output anonymization.
Trajectory Grouping
Although there are numerous k-anonymity algorithms proposed for single table datasets, a grouping based approach is discussed to be more suitable for the anonymization of complex structures, due to the direct identification of private entities (trajectories in our case) being anonymized [36] . Most clustering algorithms can easily be modified for k-anonymity by enforcing that the size of the clusters should be more than k [2, 35, 12, 1] . The only challenge at this stage is to define a distance metric between trajectories. Since our objective is to minimize the log cost metric, we can define the distance of two trajectories as the cost of their optimal anonymization. Having said that the problem reduces to finding the cost optimal anonymization given two trajectories.
Finding the optimal anonymization of two trajectories is the same as finding the point matching between the two trajectories such that anonymizing the trajectories through the matching minimizes the log cost. A similar alignment problem is well studied for strings (where the goal is to find an alignment of strings such that total pairwise edit distance between the strings is minimized) in the context of DNA comparisons. Alignment problem for two trajectories is polynomial and can be solved by using a dynamic programming approach. The equation that solves the alignment problem for optimizing against a given incremental function σ is given in Table 1 . The log cost metric (LCM) is also incremental and defines σ as follows:
So the distance between two trajectories tr1 and tr2 is given by
In this work, we adapted and slightly modified the condensation based grouping algorithm given in [1] for trajectory k-anonymity. Algorithm multi TGA given in Algorithm 1, in each iteration, creates an empty group G, randomly samples one trajectory tr ∈ T R, puts tr into G, sets the group representative repG = tr. Next, the closest trajectory tr ′ ∈ T R−G to repG is specified (line 6). tr ′ is added into G and group representative repG is updated as the anonymization of repG and tr ′ (line 8). Update of repG and G with new trajectories continues until G contains k trajectories. At the end of each iteration, a new group of k trajectories is formed, and is removed from T R. Trajectories in every group are anonymized with each other (details are in the next subsection.). Iteration stops when there are less than k trajectories remaining in T R.
The costly operation in the grouping algorithm is finding the closest trajectory to the group representative (line 6). This nearest neighbor operation needs to be done |T R| times and it is difficult to speed up each operation by indexing. (This is because our distance metric does not satisfy triangular inequality.) To decrease the number of operations, we also try another version of algorithm 1 (fast TGA) by skipping the update of group representative (e.g., skipping of line 9). In this case, k − 1 closest trajectories to the group representative can be found in one pass so the number of nearest neighbor operations will be |T R| k . The resulting algorithm is faster by a factor of k but expected to have less utility since it does not directly optimize against log cost function. Experiments on the time/utility relations between fast and multi TGA algorithms are provided in Section 7.
Anonymization of Trajectories
Once the groups are formed, the trajectories inside each group needs to be anonymized. As mentioned before, the anonymization process needs to specify the optimal point matching that will minimize the log cost. Finding the optimal matching between two trajectories is easy. Algorithm 
min{OP Tσ(tr1 − tr1.p1 , tr2 − tr2.p1) + σ(tr1.p1, tr2.p1), OP Tσ(tr1 , tr2 − tr2.p1) + σ(tr2.p1, ⊥), OP Tσ(tr1 − tr1.p1 , tr2) + σ(tr1.p1, ⊥)}, |tr1|, |tr2| > 0.
Algorithm 1 multi & fast TGA(T R, k)
Require: Set of trajectories T R, integer k > 1, the log distance metric Ensure: return k-anonymization of the trajectories in T R.
1: repeat 2: Let G be an empty group with group representative repG 3:
Let tr ∈ T R be a randomly selected trajectory.
4:
G = {tr}, repG = tr. 5:
Let tr ′ ∈ T R − G be the closest trajectory to repG. 7:
if multi TGA then 9:
repG = anonT raj(repG, tr ′ ). 10:
end if 11:
until |G| = k 12:
anonT raj(G) 13:
T R− = G 14: until |T R| < k 15: Suppress remaining trajectories in T R.
specifies the point pairs between the trajectories by tracing OP Tσ LCM and anonymizes the paired points w.r.t. each other (by replacing the points with the minimum bounding box that covers the points). Any unmatched points are suppressed.
The real challenge is to find the optimal point matching between n > 2 trajectories. Similar versions of the problem on strings were proved to be NP-Hard [25] . Trajectory alignment and its complexity is not yet studied. Due to space requirements, we present the proof that trajectory alignment problem is also NP-Hard in [34] .
Given the similar nature of the string and trajectory alignment problems, we adopted the string alignment heuristic given in [20] (where an upper bound on the total pairwise distance for the output alignment is guaranteed.) for trajectory alignment problem. Algorithm anonTraj given in Alg. 2 uses the following heuristic to come up with a possible alignment of points. Algorithm first identifies the trajectory trm whose total pairwise log cost distance with other trajectories is minimum and marks trm as done. At each step, OP Tσ LCM finds the optimal matching between the points of one unmarked trajectory trnew and the current anonymization of the marked trajectories, and marks trnew. Each matching creates links between the points. Point suppressions and generalizations are applied according to the matching. (Figure 1 shows an example anonymization of three trajectories.) In later sections, we show experimentally that alignment heuristic works in practice.
Algorithm 2 anonTraj(G)
Require: a (set) group of trajectories G. Ensure: anonymize the trajectories inside G.
1: let trm ∈ G be the trajectory whose total pairwise distance with other trajectories is minimum. 2: let set of trajectories M contains initially trm. 3: repeat 4:
let tr * be the anonymization of trajectories in M through linked points. 5:
let trnew ∈ G − M be a randomly chosen trajectory 6:
run OP Tσ LCM to find a min cost matching between the points in trnew and tr *
7:
create links between the points matched by OP Tσ LCM . 8:
suppress all unmatched points and all points directly or indirectly linked to unmatched points. 9:
let P L be the point link containing p.
13:
p = BBP L 14: end for
RANDOMIZED RECONSTRUCTION
Reconstruction as a Privacy Method
Trajectory anonymization techniques preserve the truth of the data while providing protection against certain adversaries. However the approach suffers from the following shortcomings.
Use of minimum bounding boxes in anonymization dis-
closes uncontrolled information about exact locations of the points. (E.g., in the case of two trajectories, two non-adjacent corners give out the exact locations.) This information may be critical for applications where existence of a trajectory in a dataset is sensitive (e.g., δ-presence [33] ).
2. It is challenging to take full advantage of information contained in anonymizations. Most data mining and statistical applications work on atomic trajectories
The first problem can be weakened by applying some cloaking on the sides of the rectangle or by partitioning the space into grids and returning set of grids covering all points.
The second problem is more tricky as it is a common problem for heterogenous anonymizations with large output domain. (most clustering based anonymity algorithms suffer from the same problem.) One proposed technique to solve 
this issue is reconstruction [35, 1] where an atomic dataset is recreated from the anonymized dataset by uniformly selecting atomic points from anonymized regions. It is experimentally shown in [35] that reconstruction is sufficiently successful in learning from anonymized data. In this work, we adapt the reconstruction approach as a means for privacy protection (as in [1] ) and release reconstructed data rather than anonymized data. The intuition behind is that reconstruction not only serves as a solution to learn from the heterogeneous anonymized datasets but also greatly weakens the first problem without requiring a user input. We define the reconstruction tr R of trajectory tr * in Table 2 .
An example reconstruction is shown in Figure 2 . The output after reconstruction is atomic and suitable for any trajectory application.
Maximizing Utility: The Log Cost Metric
The success of the anonymization heavily depends on the success of the reconstructed data in explaining the original data. Since we have tr ⊂ tr * between original trajectory tr and its anonymization tr * , the probability of generating the original trajectory is non-zero and given by the constant denominator in Table 2 
The Equation 2 equally weights the effects of time and space on the reconstruction. This is not desirable if we have the class of target applications given in Section 5. So instead, we weight the log cost metric; p i ∈tr * ws(log |xi| + log |yi|) + wt log |ti|
Since a given anonymization tr * of tr does not contain the points suppressed in tr, Equation 3 does not add any log cost regarding those suppressed points. However a suppressed point can be safely thought as a point covering the whole universal space. 2 The final weighted log cost function is given by;
[ws(log |xi| + log |yi|) + wt log |ti|]
+(|tr| − |tr * |) · (ws log S + wt log T ) (4)
EXPERIMENTS
We run a set of experiments on a trajectory dataset generated by using the state-of-the-art Brinkhoff generator 3 . It contains 1000 spatio-temporal trajectories with an average length of 70 points, for a total of 70118 spatio-temporal points.
Experiments focus on (1) measuring the amount of utility preserved after anonymization and perturbation processes, and (2) time performance.
Utility
We compared the anonymized datasets (by varying k and the anonymization heuristics) against the original one, measuring how much different they are according to a number of metrics.
Number of Removed Points
The anonymization step allows suppression of points or trajectories, depending on the cost associated to suppression. We used a high cost for suppressions, but notice that since trajectories may have different lengths, suppression may be required to enforce k-anonymity. the results on two heuristics used in our experiments: multi, i.e. logdistance computed on multiple trajectories; and fast, where logdistance has been always computed only on trajectory pairs (see Section 5.3). As expected, the number of removed points generally increases with k. Notice that multi has a low distortion, with less than 9% of points removed even with k = 25. On the contrary, fast heuristic needs to remove nearly twice or three times the number of points removed by multi 4
Distortion on Clustering
We also analyzed the utility of the anonymized datasets for mining purposes. We measured the deviation from the original clustering results,i.e., we compare clusters obtained from the original trajectory dataset (reference partition) against the clusters obtained from the sanitized dataset (response partition). For the evaluation, we used a bottom-up completelink agglomerative clustering algorithm, coupled with the ERP distance metric [9] , which has been specifically developed for trajectories.
As the algorithm requires to specify the number of clusters as input, we ranged from 2 to 60 clusters. Note that due to the large number of experiments and the final complexity of the clustering algorithm we used 5 the whole comparison process required days of computation.
We used a standard approach to evaluate clusters. We considered every pair of trajectories and verified whether both are in the same cluster in the reference partition and whether they are in the response partition. We have therefore four case, namely: true positive (TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP), false negative (FN). Then we computed the following standard measures:
• accuracy = (T P + T N )/(T P + F N + F P + T N );
• precision = T P/(T P + F P );
• and recall = T P/(T P + F N ). Figure 4 shows the results computed from the sanitization datasets, by using different (prearranged) number of clusters. Figures 4(a,b,c) show the behavior of the multi heuristic, while on the second row Figures 4(d,e,f) show a similar behavior for the fast heuristic. In this set of experiments, we notice therefore that for clustering purposes, the fast heuristic has nice behavior. In order to better understand the values of each measure used in the plots, we also show results of a "random algorithm", i.e. a randomly-selected reference partition of uniformly distributed clusters. For a reasonable number of clusters (e.g., up to 20) all the measures reported good results. We can also notice that smaller k's result in less distortion, although there is not a tight monotonicity due to the randomization steps.
Time Performance
In Figure 5 , we show a plot on time performance. As we can see, execution time grows linearly with increasing k for multi algorithm, while fast is almost constant. Also notice that multi required almost 3 hours for k = 25; for datasets larger than 3K-4K trajectories, running time may be infeasible for multi, while fast scales well.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
As we define and enforce k-anonymity for spatio-temporal databases, there are still issues not addressed explicitly in this work. 4 for k = 2 the two heuristics are equals, and the only small difference is due to the randomization in the reconstruction of trajectories 5 Our hierarchical clustering implementation requires O(n 3 ) distance computations (where n is the number of trajectories), and each ERP computation requires, by using dynamic programming, O(l 2 ) (where l is the longest trajectory). k-anonymity provides de-identification for individually identifiable data. However as mentioned before, when sensitive information is present, k-anonymity does not necessarily prevent the disclosure of the sensitive information. (As mentioned in item 2 of Section 4.2; for trajectory datasets, sensitive information could be the requests done by the individual to location based services.) This is mainly because k-anonymity does not enforce diversity on the sensitive info within each equality groups. Such issues have been addressed with alternative privacy definitions [24, 27, 29] . Such extensions on k-anonymity are generally independent of the anonymization process; the inherit grouping mechanisms are modified to enforce additional constraints. As mentioned in the paper, trajectory anonymization can work with any clustering grouping mechanism, thus any extension working on clustering based k-anonymity also works in the domain of trajectories.
6 For example, ℓ-diversity can be achieved:
• by applying a higher (or infinite) weight between the entities with similar sensitive values as stated in [7] .
• by using a top-down hierarchical clustering approach (note that the methodology presented in this paper is independent of the clustering algorithm) and partition clusters only if diversity requirement is not violated to achieve ℓ-diversity [26] .
• by simply suppressing those clusters violating the constraints. This approach has the advantage of being resistant against minimality attacks [43] .
However we leave the practical evaluation of enforcing other privacy definitions on trajectory databases as a future study.
When multiple k-anonymizations of the same private entities is released, a privacy attack known as intersection attack becomes possible (where two equality groups containing a specific individual is intersected to identify an individual). So releasing anonymizations of trajectories in a fixed region per period may be subject to such attack. However such an attack is possible only if the quasi-identifiers (and the sensitive attributes) do not change over time, and as for the trajectories, this is generally not the case. Designing intersection resistant k-anonymization is not a specific problem to trajectories but could be pursued as a future study. 6 This is also true for anonymization of dynamic databases [41, 8] . 
CONCLUSIONS
We addressed privacy issues regarding the identification of individuals while sharing trajectory datasets. We redefined the notion of k-anonymity for sequences of spatio-temporal points, and further provided privacy by releasing only a randomly generated set of representative trajectories. A novel generalization-based approach, which exploits previous results on string alignment, has been successfully applied to trajectory data for the first time. We also propose an additional, simple reconstruction step for applications where generalized trajectories are not effective, but true k-anonymity must be provably preserved.
Experiments show that the log distance and the heuristics proposed are effective for trajectory dataset sharing.
